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Greasing the Squeaky Wheels of Justice: Designing the
Bankruptcy Courts of the Twenty-First Century
Christopher F. Carlton •
We certainly agree that the problems are there-the bankruptcy system
is broken, it's been broken for years; an attempt was made in 1978 to
repair it. That attempt, it has been shown over the last 20 years, just
hasn't worked out right and it needs to be readjusted to a fairer system-fairer to consumers, fairer to debtors, fairer to creditors. 1
I. INTRODUCTION

For the last century, the institutional characteristics of the United
States bankruptcy system have been studied and debated. As a result,
the system has been overhauled numerous times, but with only limited
success. The present bankruptcy court structure fails to provide legal
clarity and inflicts a great social cost, both in time and money on the
American people. While the few critics of bankruptcy reform indicate
that the bankruptcy courts are functioning and will continue to function
in the manner in which they were developed over a century ago, the
great majority of opinion holds that the bankruptcy courts are embroiled
in a potential disaster which threatens their institutional framework.
Bankruptcy filings are "booming in America like never before. " 2
Filings have been intensifying as individuals and businesses continue to
increase their debt load. Incredibly, in 1996 over one million bankruptcy cases were filed and the statistics suggest that filings will continue to increase at a staggering twenty-seven percent per year. 3 This
* Copyright~ 1999 by Christopher F. Carlton. Mr. Carlton is with the law firm of
Morris, Nichols, Arsht and Tunnell in Wilmington, Delaware. His practice involves corporate and commercial litigation, with an emphasis on cases involving mergers and acquisitions, proxy contests and consent solicitations, and shareholder class and derivative actions.
1. George Wallace, Picking Up the Pieces on Bankruptcy Reform, AM. BANKR. INST. J.
1' 8-9 (1998-1999).
2. See Charles M. Tatelbaum, Testimony Before the House Judicial Committee's Subcommittee on Commercial Law on the Operation of the Bankruptcy Court System, 1997 ABI JNL.
LEXIS 182 (June, 1997) (discussing the increased number of bankruptcy filings); Honorable Robert F. Hershner, Jr., Incoming NCBJ President Looks Ahead At Issues, 1997 ABI JNL. LEXIS 226
at 4 (Oct., 1997) (same).
3. Tatelbaum, supra note 2, at 182. See also Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,
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radical escalation in the volume of bankruptcy filings exacerbates the
troubles now confronted daily by practitioners and jurists with the current inadequate structure of the bankruptcy court system.
The need for reform is clear, and has been for some time. 4 Given
the bankruptcy system's inadequacies and escalating caseloads, pressure
has been mounting for congressional action for decades. 5 Commentators, policy makers, and judges have proposed a variety of solutions to
the problems faced by the bankruptcy courts, but few have been
adopted. The purpose of this Article is to provide a comprehensive survey and critique of the most effective proposals for reform to deal with
the difficulties now faced by the bankruptcy courts. This Article first
provides an overview of the current structure of the bankruptcy court
system and highlights many of its flaws. 6 Next, this Article examines
the three most popular proposals for remedying the bankruptcy courts'
ills: granting Article III status to bankruptcy court judges/ direct appeal
of bankruptcy decisions to the courts of appeals; 8 and the implementation of bankruptcy appellate panels in all of the circuits. 9 Finally, this
article concludes that, although the continuing deterioration of the
bankruptcy court system demands profound change, it is within our

Bankruptcy Filings Pass One Million Mark (Aug. 28, 1996) (noting the fact that one million bankruptcy cases are filed each year and the number continues to increase); Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist, Remarks at Annual Spring Meeting of the American Bankruptcy Institute (May 18,
1992), reprinted in 138 CONG. REc. S7396 (daily ed. June 3, 1992) ("In 1992, one million bankruptcy cases were expected to be filed, which is tremendous when only 250,000 civil cases and
50,000 criminal cases were estimated.").
4. See Stephen Gerling, Suggestions for the National Bankruptcy Review Commission and
Congress, 4 AM. BANKR. INS. L. REV. 519 (1996) ("The recently released statistics stating that
for the twelve month period ending June 30, 1996 there were 1,042,110 bankruptcy filings will
cause, once again, a heightened awareness by Congress focused on the need for bankruptcy reform."); Hon. Leif M. Clark, Reprise on Article III Status for Bankruptcy Judges, 1997 ABI JNL.
LEXIS 148, at 2 (May, 1997) (noting need for reform); Michael Denhem, A Call For Bankruptcy
Reform: The Fifth Circuit Limits The Texas Homestead Exemption And Further Complicates The
Exemption Controversy, 30 TEX. TECH L. REv. 269, 291 (1999) ("There is a substantial need for
bankruptcy reform, which may include adopting a purely uniform federal bankruptcy law or revising the Code language .... "); Rehnquist, supra note 3, (advocating reform based, at least in
part, on the increasing number of bankruptcy filings); Bankruptcy Needs Reform, N.Y. TIMES,
April 14, 1993, at A20 (editorial) (promoting bankruptcy court reform).
5. Jeb Barnes, Bankrupt Bargain? Bankruptcy Reform and the Politics of Adversarial Legalism, 13 J.L. & POL. 893, 908 (1997).
6. For a discussion of the current structure of the bankruptcy court system and its flaws,
see infra notes 11-54 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of the proposal to grant Article III status to bankruptcy court judges,
see infra notes 55-83 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of the proposal to allow direct appeal of bankruptcy decisions to the
courts of appeals, see infra notes 84-126 and accompanying text.
9. A bankruptcy appellate panel is a panel of three bankruptcy judges who hear all firstlevel appeals. For a further discussion on bankruptcy appellate panels, see infra notes 127-84 and
accompanying text.
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reach and steps must be taken to ensure that substantial justice is not
sacrificed as we begin the twenty-first century. 10
II. BACKGROUND

The current bankruptcy court system has been described as a system of "remarkable complexity. " 11 To fully understand exactly why the
bankruptcy courts are in such dire need of reform and to better assess
the merits of the reforms discussed in this Article, a brief description of
the development and the jurisdictional limitations of the bankruptcy
courts is helpful.

A. History ofthe Bankruptcy Court-Pre-Northern Pipeline
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution authorizes
Congress "to establish ... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States. " 12 Because the Constitution grants
this power to the legislative branch, bankruptcy courts are considered
Article I (legislative) courts rather than Article III (judicial) courts. As
a result, bankruptcy courts and judges are not conferred with the same
scope of powers as their Article III counterparts. Bankruptcy courts
only have the authority that is vested through congressional action. 13 In
other words, each power exercised by the bankruptcy courts must be
linked to a statute granting that power. 14

10. For a discussion of the conclusion to this article, see infra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
11. Daniel J. Busse!, Power, Authority, and Precedent in Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code,
41 UCLA L. REv. 1063, 1065 (1994).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. As a result of this grant, bankruptcy is exclusively an
area of federal law and states may not create any bankruptcy laws, nor may they exercise control
over the field. See Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y.
1991) ("Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases .... "); In re Bowers,
16 B.R. 298, 302 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (stating that bankruptcy courts "take original and exclusive jurisdiction of bankruptcy cases").
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). Section 151, "Designation of Bankruptcy Courts," states:
In each judicial district, the bankruptcy judges in regular active service shall constitute
a unit of the district court to be known as the bankruptcy court for that district. Each
bankruptcy judge, as a judicial officer of the district court, may exercise the authority
conferred under this chapter with respect to any action, suit, or proceeding and may
preside alone and hold a regular or special session of the court, except as otherwise
provided by law or by rule or order of the district court.
/d.

14. See Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 449 (1929) (holding that the authority of
non-Article III courts is not only circumscribed by the Constitution, but limited as well by the
powers given to it by Congress); Taxel v. Marine Midland Bus. Loans, Inc., 138 B.R. 959, 963
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1992) ("Bankruptcy court judges cannot conduct jury trials ... unless they
have a statutory basis for such authority."); Plastiras v. !dell, 827 F.2d 1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 1987)
("Congress vests bankruptcy courts with their jurisdiction and their authority has no 'inherent'
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The first grant of authority to the bankruptcy courts was over a
century ago with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. 15 Under
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, bankruptcy judges were referred to as
"referees" 16 and performed only ministerial functions, such as the supervision and administration of bankruptcy cases. 17 In 1973, the Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure were promulgated wherein the title of referee
was changed to "bankruptcy judge," but the powers of the office were
not significantly altered. 18
In 1978, based on the recommendation of the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, 19 Congress passed what is now
referred to as the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 ("1978 Act"). 20 The
1978 Act was one of the first substantial overhauls in bankruptcy law
since the inception of the bankruptcy system. The primary purpose of
the 1978 Act was to modernize the bankruptcy laws and to provide
bankruptcy courts with jurisdiction over all disputes that could affect
the debtor's bankruptcy. 21 Perhaps the most significant reform created
by the 1978 Act was the transformation in bankruptcy litigation from
the federal district courts to the revamped bankruptcy courts. 22 Under
the newly-fashioned bankruptcy court system, Congress conferred upon
bankruptcy judges the broad power to hear and make final decisions in
"all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or related to
cases under Title 11. " 23 The United States Bankruptcy Courts were created as "courts of record" and were designated as "adjuncts to the district courts for such districts. " 24

source.").
15. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1979).
16. See H.R. REP. No. 95-598, at 8 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5969
(chronicling the history of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
17. See id. Referees served two-year terms by appointment and were paid by commission.
!d. The duties of the referees were similar to that of a trustee in modern day practice. !d.
18. See id. at 9. The change in name was an attempt to recognize the judicial status of the
referees. !d.
19. Congress created the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States in 1970
to analyze current bankruptcy laws and recommend needed changes. See id. at 1.
20. See id.
21. SeeS. REP. No. 95-1106, at 1 (1978); see also STEPHEN E. SNYDER & LAWRENCE
PONOROFF, COMMERCIAL BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION 2-3 (1992) (discussing the intended purpose
of the 1978 Act). Under this broad jurisdictional grant, the bankruptcy court could decide debtor's
claims against third parties that were based on state or federal non-bankruptcy law. !d.
22. See Lloyd D. George, From Orphan to Maturity: The Development of the American
Bankruptcy System During L. Ralph Mecham's Tenure as Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1491, 1493 (1995).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1988). Title 11 of the U.S. Code contains the laws relating to
bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (1978).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1978).
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B. The United States Supreme Court Levels a Blow to the Jurisdiction
of the Bankruptcy Courts
Only four years after passage of the 1978 Act, the United States
Supreme Court issued a landmark decision on the power of the bankruptcy courts that left their future in doubt. In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. ,25 the Court held that the
broad jurisdictional grant to bankruptcy courts under the 1978 Act was
unconstitutional because it impermissibly gave Article III judicial powers to bankruptcy judges. 26
In Northern Pipeline, a debtor had filed for Chapter 11 reorganization in the bankruptcy court. 27 Later, the debtor filed a suit in the same
court against a creditor for alleged breach of contract and warranty,
misrepresentation, coercion, and duress. 28 The creditor moved for dismissal on the grounds that the 1978 Act "unconstitutionally conferred
Article III judicial power" upon Article I judges. 29 The bankruptcy
judge rejected this contention30 but the district court reversed and the
case went directly to the United States Supreme Court. 31 The Supreme
Court, in a four-justice plurality opinion by Justice Brennan, affirmed
the district court's decision and held that it was unconstitutional for a
bankruptcy judge to hear and decide the estate's action. 32 The Court
first found that Congress did not create the bankruptcy courts as Article

25. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
26. !d. at 87 (plurality opinion); !d. at 91-92 (concurring opinion).
27. !d. at 56.
28. !d.
29. !d. at 56-57. There was also a question as to whether the bankruptcy court could even
exercise jurisdiction because the breach of contract claim was a state-based claim. !d.
30. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 6 B.R. 928 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1980).
31. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 12 B.R. 946 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1981).
32. Northern Pipeline Construction Co., 458 U.S. at 86-87. Joining Justice Brennan in the
plurality opinion were Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor
concurred in the judgment but did not agree with Justice Brennan's constitutional analysis. !d. at
90-91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice White, who was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell in his dissent, also rejected the constitutional analysis posited by Justice Brennan. !d. at
103 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White argued that Justice Brennan should have confined his
holding of invalidity to the specific jurisdiction exercised by the bankruptcy court. See id. ("Even
if there are specific powers now vested in bankruptcy judges that should be performed by Article
III judges, the great bulk of their functions are unexceptionable and should be left intact."). Writing his own dissent, Chief Justice Burger stated that the lower court had not held that Congress'
broad grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts was inconsistent with Article III of the Constitution. Rather the holding was limited to the proposition that "a traditional state common-law action, not made subject to a federal rule of decision, and related only peripherally to an adjudication
of bankruptcy under federal law, must, absent the consent of the litigants, be heard by an Article
III court." !d. at 92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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III courts, nor could the precedents for the creation of Article I "Legislative" courts (i.e. territorial courts, the courts of the District of Columbia, courts martial, and administrative agencies adjudicating cases
involving "public rights") support the extensive grant of jurisdiction to
the bankruptcy courts. 33 The Court then concluded that granting power
to the bankruptcy courts to hear all civil proceedings arising under title
11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11 was constitutionally
flawed because it "impermissibly removed most, if not all, of the essential attributes of the judicial power from the Article III district court
and has vested those attributes in a non-Article III adjunct. " 34

C. The Fallout After Northern Pipeline
The Northern Pipeline decision dealt a heavy blow to the constitutional status of the bankruptcy courts and Congress was forced to restructure the courts as well as several sections of the United States
Code as a result. Two years after Northern Pipeline was decided, 35
Congress amended the 1978 Act with the passage of the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 ("BAFJA"). 36 BAFJA
33. !d. at 63. The plurality opinion explained that congressional control over territories and
the District of Columbia rested on the absence of a state government in these geographical areas.
Congress has "complete power of government" in these locations under Article IV of the Constitution. !d. at 64. Congress has the authority to provide for courts martial under Article I, Section
8, Clauses 13 and 14 of the Constitution, which give Congress the power to "make Rules for the
government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." !d. at 66. The plurality also concluded
that the right to recover contract damages involved "the adjudication of state-created private
rights," rather than "the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations." !d. at 71. Thus, the Court
concluded that bankruptcy court jurisdiction over such a right could not be justified by cases involving adjudication of public rights by legislative courts or administrative agencies. !d.
34. !d. at 87.
35. Because the Supreme Court had held that the grant of authority to the bankruptcy courts
was unconstitutional, upon motion of the Solicitor General, the Supreme Court stayed its judgment
until December 24, 1982. See United States v. Marathon Pipeline Co. (Northern Pipeline II), 458
U.S. 50 (1982). The stay was ordered to give Congress some time to remedy the legislation so that
the effect of declaring the bankruptcy system unconstitutional would not be catastrophic. George,
supra note 22, at 1494-95. The Court denied a subsequent motion to extend that stay past that
date, but did allow for prospective application so that cases filed before that date could proceed
without disruption. See Northern Pipeline II, 458 U.S. at 88. At this point, the Judicial Conference
of the United States proposed a draft "Emergency Rule" to be adopted by the district courts which
it thought would enable the bankruptcy court system to continue to operate in a constitutional
fashion. The Emergency Rule referred to the bankruptcy courts "all cases under title 11 and all
civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11," but permitted the district court to withdraw the reference at any time. The Emergency rule gave the bankruptcy courts authority to perform "all acts and duties necessary" to handle referred cases and proceedings, but it barred them from conducting (i) proceedings to enjoin a court; (ii) proceedings to
punish criminal contempt not committed in the presence of the bankruptcy judge; (iii) appeals from
a decision of a bankruptcy judge; or (iv) jury trials. For the complete text of the Emergency Rule,
see appendix to White Motor Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., 704 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1983).
36. For the legislative history of BAFJA, see Walter J. Taggart, The New Bankruptcy Court
System, 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231, 237-38 (1985).
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designated bankruptcy judges as a "unit of the district court to be
known as the bankruptcy court for that district, " 37 to serve as "judicial
officers of the United States district court established under Article III
of the Constitution. " 38 BAFJA also authorized the courts of appeals to
appoint bankruptcy judges to fourteen-year terms39 and provided that a
bankruptcy judge could be removed during that fourteen-year term
"only for incompetence, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or
mental disability. " 40 Most notably, however, BAFJA permitted the district courts to refer to the bankruptcy courts all cases arising under title
11 and all core proceedings41 arising under title 11 or arising in a case
under title 11. 42
Thus, under BAFJA, Congress vested the bankruptcy court with
two distinct kinds of judicial power dependent upon the subject matter
before the court. With regard to cases arising under title 11 and core
proceedings, the bankruptcy court has the same power to determine
both the law and facts as the federal district court. The district court's
review of these types of cases is analogous to ordinary appellate review.43 With regard to non-core proceedings, 44 however, the bank37. BAFJA § 104(a), 98 Stat. 333, 336 (1984) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1)(1988).
39. !d.
40. !d. § 152(e).
41. Core proceedings include, but are not limited to, the following:
(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions from property
of the estate, and estimation of claims or interest for the purposes of confirming a plan
under chapter Eleven, Twelve, or Thirteen of Title 11 but not the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death claims against
the estate for purposes of distribution in a case under Title 11;
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate;
(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;
(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
(G) motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay;
(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances;
(I) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts;
(J) objections to discharges;
(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens;
(L) confirmation of plans;
(M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use of case collateral;
(N) orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting from claims
brought by the estate against persons who have not filed claims against the estate; and
(0) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder relationship, except personal
injury tort or wrongful death claims.
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (1988).
42. !d. § 157(a)-(b).
43. Compare Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Berryman Prods., Inc., 159 F.3d 941, 943 &
n.6 (5th Cir. 1988) (reviewing bankruptcy court's findings of fact under clearly erroneous stan-
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ruptcy judge may render a final judgment 45 only with the consent of the
parties. 46 Absent consent, in a non-core proceeding, the bankruptcy
court may only submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law, which are subject to de novo review by the district court. 47
D. Congress' Most Recent Attempt at Bankruptcy Reform-The 1994 Act

The most recent significant bankruptcy reform legislation was the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 (the "1994 Act"). President Clinton
stated that the 1994 Act was "the most broad-based bankruptcy reform
measure to be signed into law in sixteen years. " 48 Congress' motive for
passing the broad reform legislation was clear: a concern about the
tremendous number of bankruptcy filings in the 1990's and the strain
they placed on the system. 49 Congress also wanted to address concerns
presented by several "problematic court opinions construing the Bankruptcy Code. " 50 One of the most significant provisions in the 1994 Act
was the requirement that judicial councils within a circuit consider establishing a bankruptcy appellate panel to decide bankruptcy appeals in
all cases where a party has not opted-out. 51 However, the power of
bankruptcy judges to enter final judgments only in "core" proceedings
but not in "non-core" proceedings remained unchanged by the 1994
Act. 52
dard). with Daniels-Head & Assocs. v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 819 F.2d 914, 919 (9th Cir.
1987) (reviewing bankruptcy court's conclusion of law under de novo standard).
44. Non-core proceedings are state-law based claims that are independent of the title 11
claims. See Tisha Morris, Note, The Establishment of Bankruptcy Appellate Panels Under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994: Historical Background and Sixth Circuit Analysis, 26 MEM. ST.
L. REv. 1501, 1504 (1996).
45. An interlocutory decision of the bankruptcy court is also reviewable by the federal district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1988). The statute provides that appeals to the district court
from interlocutory bankruptcy court orders require "leave of the court." It is unclear, however,
whether that leave is sought from the district court, the bankruptcy court or both. Compare In re
United Press Int'l Inc., 60 B.R. 265, 276 (Bankr. D.C. 1986) (requiring certification by the bankruptcy judges as well as the district judge) and Connelly v. Shatkin Inv. Corp., 57 B.R. 794, 796
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) (same), with Bertoli v. D'Avella, 812 F.2d 136, 140 (3d Cir. 1987) (no
certification by the bankruptcy judge is required).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (1988).
47. See !d. § 157(c)(l) (1988) (providing that a bankruptcy judge cannot enter a final judgment on a non-core case).
48. Statement by President William Jefferson Clinton upon signing H.R. 5116, 30 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 2129 (Oct. 22, 1994).
49. See H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 32 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340,
3340-41.
50. !d.
51. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1994). For further discussion on bankruptcy appellate panels, see irifra notes 127-84 and accompanying text.
52. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)-(c) (1994). For a discussion of the core and non-core distinction, see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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E. The Current Structure is Inadequate
Although the creation of bankruptcy appellate panels was a significant step toward reform, the 1994 Act fell painfully short of solving the
problems faced by the bankruptcy courts. Under the current deficient
structure, the precedential value accorded to bankruptcy court decisions
is largely disputed, leading to unsettled rules of law and unnecessary
appeals. 5 3 Moreover, district court judges, instead of specialized bankruptcy judges who are more qualified to deal with the highly technical
and specialized field of bankruptcy law, are rendering opinions on
complex issues of bankruptcy law resulting in the unnecessary expenditure of the most precious judicial resource-the judges' time. 54 Thus,
the bankruptcy courts continue to languish under an antiquated system
whereby litigants, practitioners, and even jurists lack a clear construction of the law. Moreover, as the number of litigants in the bankruptcy
courts continues to mount at an alarming rate, the ills now plaguing the
bankruptcy system are exacerbated. Therefore, the present structure of
the bankruptcy courts merits immediate attention by Congress. Implementation of any of the following proposals would be a good start.
III. GRANT BANKRUPTCY JUDGES ARTICLE III STATUS
A proposal that has been advocated for decades as a cure-all to the
problems faced by the bankruptcy courts is to grant them Article III
status. 55 Although the 1978 Act greatly expanded the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy courts by conferring virtually independent judicial power
upon the bankruptcy judges, the 1978 Act did not provide bankruptcy
judges with Article III status. 56 Leading reformers believe that "much
53. For a discussion of the disputed precedential value accorded to bankruptcy court decisions, see infra notes 67-68, 94-102, 172-83 and accompanying text.
54. For a discussion of the problem of having district court judges decide complex issues of
bankruptcy law instead of bankruptcy judges, see infra notes 72-74, 104-05, 144-50 and accompanying text.
55. The legislative history of the 1978 Act embodies the constitutional benefits of the proposal to grant the bankruptcy court with Article III status:
[T]he Constitution suggests that an independent bankruptcy court must be created under
Article III. Article III is the constitutional norm, and the limited circumstances in which
the courts have permitted departure from the requirements of Article III are not present
in the bankruptcy context. Even if they were present, the text of the Constitution and
the case law indicate that a court created without regard to Article III most likely could
not exercise the power needed by a bankruptcy court to carry out its proper functions .... Congress should establish the proposed bankruptcy court under Article III,
with all of the protection that the Framers intended for an independent judiciary.
H.R. REP. No. 95-598, at 390 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6000.
56. In 1978, the Senate refused to bestow bankruptcy judges with Article III protections and
the resulting 1978 Act was a compromise in order to allow the judges to hold broad authority. See
40 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2200-01 No. 36 (1982).
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of the hard and winding road of bankruptcy jurisprudence, as trailblazed since 1978, could have been avoided if Congress followed its
original plan and bestowed Article III status on bankruptcy jurists.
Shamefully, it missed the opportunity to do so in 1984,57 and then again
in 1994. "58
Granting Article III status to the bankruptcy courts is a necessary
predicate to increase the powers of bankruptcy judges under the Constitution. Article III protection has always been regarded as fundamental to ensuring the separation of powers vital to our system of government. 59 Article III provides that the "judicial power of the United
States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts, as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. " 60
Article III further mandates that these federal courts be staffed by
judges who hold their offices during good behavior and receive a compensation which shall not be diminished during their time in office. 61
Thus, the "Good Behavior Clause" and the "Compensation Clause"
provide life tenure and an irreducible salary. 62 These clauses serve both
to protect "the role of the independent judiciary within the constitu57. In 1984, the House of Representatives sought to confer Article III status on bankruptcy
judges but the Senate favored reducing the independence and power of the bankruptcy judges. See
H.R. 6978, 97th Cong., 128 CONG. REC. H5871 (bill that proposed to elevate bankruptcy judges
to Article III status).
58. Anthony Michael Sabino, Suggestion for the National Bankruptcy Review Commission
and Congress: Anicle lii Status, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 545 (1996) (footnotes added).
59. The framers of the United States Constitution were steadfast in their conviction that
Article III status was an essential institutional safeguard. As the 9th Circuit has noted: "[O]ur own
experience attests to the substance and reality of [Article III's] guarantees. A separate and independent judiciary, and the guarantees that assure it, are present constitutional necessities, not relics
of antique ideas." Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am. v. lnstromedix, 725 F.2d 537, 541 (9th
Cir. 1984) (en bane).
60. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
61. /d.

62. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78, 79 (Alexander Hamilton) specifically addressed the purposes of these clauses: to remove the federal judiciary from potential domination by the executive
and legislative branches, and to guarantee the protection of individual rights through an independentjudiciary. Hamilton wrote the following about the Good Behavior Clause:
That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution, and of individuals, which we perceive to be indispensable in the courts of justice, can certainly not be
expected from judges who hold their offices by a temporary commission. Periodical appointments, however regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, in some way or other,
be fatal to their necessary independence.
FEDERALIST No. 78. With respect to the Compensation Clause, Hamilton wrote:
Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the
judges than a fixed provision for their support. ... In the general course of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will. And we can
never hope to see realized in practice, the complete separation of the judicial system
which leaves the former dependent for pecuniary resources on the occasional grants of
the latter.
FEDERALIST No. 79.
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tiona! scheme of tripartite government" and "to safeguard litigants'
rights to have claims decided before judges who are free from potential
domination by other branches of government. " 63 The United States Supreme Court, in Northern Pipeline, 64 reiterated the importance of the
separation of powers function of Article III requirements, and found
that the federal judiciary was "designed ... to stand independent of the
Executive and Legislature - to maintain the checks and balances of the
constitutional structure, and also to guarantee that the process of adjudication itself remained impartial. " 65
The need for an Article III bankruptcy court is instantly recognizable. The bankruptcy courts are now encumbered with certain constitutional limitations that prevent the courts from efficiently fulfilling their
intended role. Granting bankruptcy judges with Article III status would
allow the bankruptcy courts to decide all bankruptcy cases, both core
and non-core; thereby eliminating the need for appellate review by the
district courts. 66 Moreover, in order for the bankruptcy courts to be totally effective, it is essential that the decisions rendered by the bankruptcy courts be given finality. Under the current court structure, the
precedential value accorded to bankruptcy court decisions and district
court decisions deciding issues of bankruptcy law is uncertain. 67 If
given Article III status, jurisprudential certainty would ensue as the decisions rendered by the bankruptcy courts would be binding precedent
and the need for review by the district court would be eliminated. 68
Also, the bankruptcy courts would have the power to conduct jury trials69 and issue contempt orders, 70 both of which the bankruptcy courts

63. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (citing
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980)). See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JuRISDICTION
181 (1989) (stating that Article III protections were "intended to insulate federal judges from direct
political pressure and ensure that they would uphold the Constitution and federal laws without regard to the popularity of their actions."); MARTIN H REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS
IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 53 (2d ed. 1990) ("The essential characteristic of the
Article III courts ... is the independence their judges possess with respect to the executive and
legislative branches of the federal government.").
64. 458 U.S. at 64 (plurality opinion).
65. /d. at 58.
66. See Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., The Case Against Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, 4 GEO.
MASON L. REV 1, 15 (1995).
67. For a discussion of the precedential value of bankruptcy court opinions and district
court opinions deciding issues of bankruptcy law, see infra notes 95-98, 172-84 and accompanying
text.
68. See Wiseman, Jr., supra note 66, at 15.
69. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Schwartzman, 13 F.3d 122, 128
(4th Cir. 1993) ("We hold that bankruptcy judges are not authorized to conduct jury trials; where
the Seventh Amendment provides the right to a jury trial in a core proceeding in bankruptcy, it
must take place in the district court."); Orion Pictures Corp. v. Showtime Networks, Inc., 4 F.3d
1095, 1101 (2d Cir. 1993) ("the constitution prohibits bankruptcy courts from holding jury trials
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are arguably not constitutionally competent to do under the current
system. Still another benefit of conferring Article III status to bankruptcy court judges is that the district courts would be unchained from
their bankruptcy case-loads. Not only would this free up valuable judicial resources, but it would also provide greater uniformity by having
fewer courts and fewer judges dealing with a particular issue. 71
Article III status would also ensure that bankruptcy cases are heard
by the judges most qualified to render an informed and reasoned decision. Unlike most other areas of the federal law, the bankruptcy laws
are so complex that there is a "unique need for a specialized tribunal. "72 The fact that under the current regime Article I bankruptcy
judges, who are ostensibly experts on bankruptcy issues, are subject to
review by the district courts is mystifying. It is nonsensical to place
"the best decision makers at the bottom of the decision-making hierarchy. "73 Granting Article III status to bankruptcy judges would allow the
bankruptcy court judge, who has a specialized background and has developed a certain level of expertise in the field, to resolve the complex
issues that often arise in a bankruptcy proceeding. 74 This is not to say
that the district court judges cannot master complicated issues of bankruptcy law and render an informed decision on a timely basis, rather, it
would be more efficient for the bankruptcy judges to hear such cases
thereby conserving precious judicial resources.
The critics of the proposal argue that "the elevation in status threatens the status of the present Article III judiciary, primarily by diluting
its membership and opening the door to the creation of a plethora of
'specialized courts. "' 75 Other critics of the proposal contend that the
in non-core matters."); In reUnited Mo. Bank of Kansas City, N.A., 901 F.2d 1449, 1457 (8th
Cir. 1990) ("We find no statutory authorization afforded bankruptcy judges or courts to conduct
jury trials on legal proceedings.").
70. See Laura B. Bartell, Contempt of the Bankruptcy Court-A New Look, 1996 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1 (1996) (concluding that bankruptcy judges lack the contempt power and vesting the nonArticle III bankruptcy courts with such power would violate the Constitution).
71. Donald A. Brittenham, Jr., The Pros and Cons Behind the First Circuit's Decision to
Establish Bankruptcy Appellate Panels and the Growing Question of Whether the Panels Will Last,
32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 215, 255 (1997).
72. Clark, supra note 4, at 3-4. See Thomas B. Bennett, Removal, Remand, and Abstention
Related to Bankruptcies: Yet Another Litigation Quagmire!, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 1037, 1104 (1996)
(noting the "overly complex and technical arena of bankruptcy").
73. Jeffrey J. Brookner, Bankruptcy Courts and Stare Decisis: The Need for Restructuring,
27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 313, 330 (1993).
74. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Decision-Makers: In Defense of Courts, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J.
109, 115 (1997).
75. Clark, supra note 4, at 3-4. The Honorable Lief M. Clark of the Western District of Texas
refutes this argument and advocates the need for Article III status:
Those critics who equate the issue of status with social status most certainly miss the
point, because it is only legal status that has ever been at issue in this debate. The fear
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"specialized" court would create a stratified bar with specialist attorneys having peculiar relationships with their bench and that the court
would be a target to special interests that would acquire and maintain an
undue influence in the context of bankruptcy law. 76
The great weight of opinion, however, holds that the numerous
positive aspects of granting Article III status greatly outweigh the negatives. Countering the critic's aspersions that the bankruptcy judges
would become "too specialized," the proponents argue that judges
dealing solely within one area of the law would become more familiar
with the subjects before them resulting in a substantial increase in the
number of cases they are able to handle as well as the sophistication of
their judgments. 77 Moreover, the proponents argue that specialization
would also give judges a more systematic insight into the impact of

of increased specialization in the federal judiciary has somewhat greater force, at least
if one accepts as correct the proposition that there is a positive intrinsic value to the
preservation of courts of general jurisdiction. But the bankruptcy system has created an
especially unique need for a specialized tribunal, and it is difficult to conceive of another area of federal law that would call for such a structure. For it is not so much the
uniqueness of bankruptcy law per se that has compelled the creation of a free-standing
bankruptcy judicial system, but rather its combination of volume, speed and unique
procedures.
!d. See Robert Stern, Remedies for Appellate Overload: The Ultimate Solution, 72 JUDICATURE 103,
109 (1988-1989). Stern advocates the use of specialized courts to reduce court congestion stating:
[I]t is time for American legislators, judges and lawyers to recognize that a single group
of judges always acting as a unit cannot by itself dispose of an increasing number of
thousands of cases per year, even when a large part of the work consists of determining
which cases should be accorded plenary review.
!d.
76. Ben F. Overton, A Prescription for the Appellate Caseload Explosion, 12 FLA. Sr. U. L.
REV. 205, 221-22 (1984). Overton states: "For very good reasons, the creation of specialized courts
has not been favored for addressing the problems created by expanding caseloads." !d. The following
comment by Simon Rifkind accurately explains the apprehension the skeptics carry toward specialized
courts:
A body of law, secluded from the rest, develops a jargon of its own, thought-patterns
that are unique, internal policies which it subserves and which are different from and
sometimes at odds with the policies pursued by the general law ....
Once you complete the circle of specialization by having a specialized court as well as a
specialized Bar, then you have set aside a body of wisdom that is the exclusive possession of a very small group of men who take their purposes for granted. Very soon their
internal language becomes so highly stylized as to be unintelligible to the uninitiated.
That in turn intensifies the seclusiveness of that branch of the law and that further immunizes it against the refreshment of new ideas, suggestions, adjustments and compromises which constitute the very tissue of any living system of law.
Simon Rifkind, A Special Coun for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized Judiciary, 37
A.B.A. J. 425-26 (1951).
77. See Clark, supra note 4, at 3; Thomas E. Baker, An Assessment of Past Extramural Reforms of the U.S. Couns of Appeals, 28 GA. L. REv. 863 (1994) (discussing theory of specialized
courts); Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Madif.Jing the Regional Design of the
U.S. Couns of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 603 (1989) (discussing idea of reducing judicial burdens
by reorganizing federal court system with use of specialty courts).
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their decisions on the field as a whole and provide a practical way to
attain decisions that are more contemplative as well as more uniform. 78
If Congress wants to confer bankruptcy judges with Article III
status, it may clearly do so. The Constitution leaves to Congress the
ability to make most of the important decisions about the workload of
the federal courts. Congress is constrained only by the liberal jurisdictional limits of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. 79 Indeed, in
December 1996, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission ("the
Commission") 80 recommended to Congress that the bankruptcy courts
be staffed by judges holding a life-term tenure and salary protectionthe necessary predicate of a judicial officer under Article III of the
United States Constitution. 81 Congress has already twice declined to
grant Article III status to the bankruptcy courts. 82 The advocates of the
proposal all agree, however, that Article III status is a "critical and
78. See Paul M. Bator, The Judicial Universe of Judge Richard Posner, 52 U. CHl. L. REv.
1146, 1155-56 (campaigning for specialty courts). Professor Bator concludes:
It is inevitable that we will soon have to augment substantially our institutional capacity
for authoritative decisions of national law; the system is choking at the top. There are
two ways to achieve this. One is to increase specialization at the court of appeals level.
!d. at 1155.
79. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts,
1990 BYU L. REV. 67, 75 (discussing the generous grant of authority over the lower courts to
Congress). Professors Chemerinsky & Kramer state:
Within the limits of Article III, however, the Constitution establishes no objectively
"correct" role for the lower federal courts. On the contrary, largely because they could
not agree on what role the federal courts should play, the framers of the Constitution
left such questions to Congress, essentially making the lower federal courts a resource
to be used as Congress deems necessary.
/d. (footnote omitted).
80. The National Bankruptcy Review Commission is an independent commission established pursuant to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106
(1994). The Commission was created to:
(1) investigate and study issues relating to title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code");
(2) to evaluate the advisability of proposals and current arrangements with respect to
such issues and problems;
(3) to prepare and submit to the Congress, the Chief Justice and the President a report
in accordance with section 608; and
(4) to solicit divergent views of all parties concerned with the operation of the bankruptcy system.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106, 4147 (1994).
81. Clark, supra note 4, at 1-2. The Commission's approach toward transitioning to an Article III bankruptcy court would be accomplished mainly by attrition. /d. The currently appointed
bankruptcy judges would be replaced after completion of their current fourteen-year term by newly
appointed Article III bankruptcy judges. /d. During the interim, bankruptcy jurisdiction would be
with the Article III bankruptcy judge who would refer cases to the remaining non-Article III judges
who would continue to function as adjuncts of the new Article III bankruptcy court. !d. Further,
the Commission recommended that if a district did not have an Article III bankruptcy judge, a judicial council for each circuit could designate an Article III bankruptcy judge from another district
to function as the Article III bankruptcy judge for the district. /d.
82. Vern Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The Chief Justice,
the Judicial Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 29-32 (1985).
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all agree, however, that Article III status is a "critical and long overdue
first step in the right direction" of bankruptcy court reform. 83
IV. DIRECT APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
Another proposal that has been recommended by legal scholars,
practitioners and jurists is the concept that bankruptcy appeals should
go directly to the circuit courts of appeals, thereby bypassing the district courts. 84 A movement for this proposal has quickly been gaining
momentum as the number of bankruptcy filings continues to grow at a
torrid pace.

A. Development of the Current Path of Review of Bankruptcy Court
Decisions
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, a decision from the bankruptcy
judge, (called a referee at the time) was appealable to the district court,
and following the district court's decision, appealable to the court of
appeals. 85 In the debate preceding the enactment of the 1978 Act, the
United States House of Representatives proposed an alternative appellate scheme that called for appeals from the bankruptcy courts to proceed directly to the courts of appeals. 86 Under this proposal, judges had
Article III status. 87 The United States Senate's alternative proposal,
however, provided that the first level of appeal of a bankruptcy court
decision would continue to be in the district court. 88
A compromise was reached between these two bills in the 1978 Act
which provided that the initial appeal of a decision of the bankruptcy
court would be to a district court or a bankruptcy appellate panel in cir83. Sabino, supra note 58, at 545.
84. Daniel J. Busse!, Bankruptcy Appellate Reform: Issues and Opinions, NORTON ANNUAL
SURVEY OF BANKR. L. 257 (1995-96) (Professor of Law); Nathan B. Feinstein, The Bankruptcy
System: Proposal to Restructure the Bankruptcy Court and Bankruptcy Appellate Processes,
NORTON ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 517 (1995-96) (legal practitioner); Honorable Steven W. Rhodes, Eight Statutory Causes of Delay and Expense in Chapter 1! Cases, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 287,
296 (1993) (United States Bankruptcy judge). Several others have reached the same conclusion.
See, e.g., Memorandum from Timothy P. Branigan to the American Bar Association Joint Ad Hoc
Committee on Bankruptcy Court Structure and Insolvency Processes (July 12, 1996) (proposing
reformation of current structure in favor of direct appellate review); National Bankruptcy Review
Commission Appellate Structure Proposal (Adopted June 21, 1996) (same).
85. See Lissa Lamkin Broome, Bankruptcy Appeals: The Wheel is Come Full Circle, 69
AM. BANKR. L.J. 541, 543 (Fall 1995); Judy Beckner Sloan, Appellate Jurisdiction of Interlocutory Appeals in Bankruptcy under 28 U.S.C. Section !58(d): A Case for Lapsus Calami, 40 CATH.
U. L. REV. 265, 272 (1991).
86. H.R. REP. No. 595, at 39-43 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6000-04.
87. !d. For a discussion of granting Article III status to bankruptcy court judges, see supra
notes 55-83 and accompanying text.
88. S. REP. No. 95-989 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.A.A.N. 5787.
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cuits where one had been established, 89 or directly to the court of appeals if both parties consented to circumvent the initial review by the
district court or the bankruptcy appellate panel. 90 The optional direct
review to the court of appeals upon consent of the parties was eliminated in BAFJA. 91 Thus, under the current structure of the judicial
system, the initial appeal from a bankruptcy court decision can only be
to a district court or to a bankruptcy appellate panel if one has been
adopted in the circuit in which the bankruptcy court sits. 92Appeals from
both the district court and the bankruptcy appellate panel go to the court
of appeals. 93
B. The Need for Direct Appeal
The need for direct appeal of bankruptcy court opinions to the circuit courts of appeals has never been more apparent. There are approximately ninety-four district courts and 650 district court judges.
None of the district judges is bound by a bankruptcy appeals decision of
a district judge from one of the other 93 district courts. 94 For example,
a district judge in the Southern District of New York is not bound by a
district judge in Pennsylvania or by a bankruptcy appeals decision of a
district judge in the Northern District of New York. Moreover, district

89. A bankruptcy appellate panel is a panel of three bankruptcy judges who hear all firstlevel appeals. Appeals can go directly to a bankruptcy appeals panel only if the Judicial Council in
the circuit has established a bankruptcy appellate panel, if the district judges for the district in
which the appeal arises have voted to authorize appeals to go to panels of the bankruptcy appellate
panel service; and, finally, if all parties consent to take the appeal to a bankruptcy appellate panel.
See 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l), (b)(6), (c)(l) (1994). For a further discussion on bankruptcy appellate
panels, see infra notes 127-84 and accompanying text.
90. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 236(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2667
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1293(b)), provided:
[A] court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of an appeal from a final judgment, order,
or decree of an appellate panel created under section 160 or a District court of the
United States or from a final judgment, order, or decree of a bankruptcy court of the
United States if the parties to such appeal agree to a direct appeal to the court of appeals.
!d.
91. For a further discussion of BAFJA, see supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
92. Lawrence P. King, Jurisdiction and Procedure Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of
1984, 38 VAND. L. REV. 675, 708 (1985) ("Section 158 does not sanction direct appeal to the
court of appeals from the bankruptcy court under any circumstances.").
93. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994) ("The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals
from all final decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees .... "); Fed. R. App. P. 6(a)-(b).
94. See, e.g., Threadgill v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 928 F.2d 1366, 1371 n.7 (3d
Cir. 1991) (citing authorities that stand for proposition that there is no such thing as the law of the
district); In re Coffman, 125 B.R. 238, 239 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991) (noting difficulty in
"pick[ing] a confident path through the minefield of the conflicting decisions, not only in other
circuits, but in the Western District of Missouri .... "); Newton v. Essres, 122 B.R. 422, 424-25
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (noting conflict between various district court opinions in Colorado).
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judges in multi-judge districts are not bound by the bankruptcy appeals
decisions rendered by other district judges from that same district. 95 Incredibly, there are reported cases holding that in a multi-judge district,
a bankruptcy judge is not even bound by the bankruptcy appeals decision of one of the district judges in his or her own district. 96 Thus, considering the number of district courts and the number of district judges,
the number of potentially contradictory decisions grows exponentially
with each passing day. 97
By issuing contradictory opinions, the present bankruptcy appeals
system fails to perform one of the primary functions of an appellate
court-"law declaration. " 98 Law declaration is the pronouncement of a
rule of law that serves to guide prospective behavior and ensure that all
cases receive the same treatment. 99 The law declaration function is
critical in view of the fact that the bankruptcy courts are the country's
most significant commercial courts. 100 Although bankruptcy court and
95. In re Gaylor, 123 B.R. 236, 242 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1991) (noting "that the decision
of any one district judge is not binding on other district judges"). "Of course, an en bane decision
of the district court should be binding on each judge in the district." /d. See also, Thomas Bartels,
United States District Courts En Bane- Resolving the Ambiguities, 73 JUDICATURE 40, 42 (1989).
For a comprehensive study of precedential value of bankruptcy decisions, see Busse!, supra note
11, at 1063-66.
96. See In re Shattuc Cable Corp., 138 B.R. 557, 565 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) (holding that
in a multi-judge district, the bankruptcy courts are not bound by a bankruptcy appeals decision of a
single district court judge, although deference should be given to such opinions.); First of Am.
Bank v. Gaylor, 123 B.R. 236, 241 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1991) (same); Pereira v. Centel Corp.,
134 B.R. 776, 786 n.9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (same); In re Goode, 131 B.R. 835, 840 n.2
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (same). Bankruptcy judges reason that because bankruptcy courts are
"units of the district court," see 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1988), they are not inferior courts but are courts
on the same level. See, e.g., Coyne v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 149 B.R. 614, 619 (Bankr. C.
D. Cal. 1993) (stating that the court was not bound by the district court because bankruptcy court
on same level as district court).
97. See Wiseman, Jr., supra note 66, at 15 ("There is no justification for affording two
levels of appellate review as of right.").
98. See Vicki C. Jackson, Introduction: Congressional Control of Jurisdiction and the Future of the Federal Courts-Opposition, Agreement, and Hierarchy, 86 GEO. L.J. 2445, 2479
(1998) (noting the "law declaration" function of the courts of appeals); Thomas E. Baker, Imagining the Alternative Futures of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 GA. L. REV. 913, 917 (1994)
(same); Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial
and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REv. 993, 993-98, 1038 (1986) ("law declaration is the special
province of the appellate level"); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 175 (1803) (noting
the importance of appellate review within the American judicial system, as it "revises and corrects
the proceedings in a case already instituted").
99. See Richard A. Mochonkin, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., and Hilton Davis
Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.: The Federal Circuit Gets Its Laws and Its Facts Straight,
9 HARV J.L. & TECH. 181, 183 (1996) ("The purpose of law declaration is to formulate standards
of general applicability .... "); Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1867, 1938 (1966) (law declaration "involves the formulation in general
terms of principles potentially applicable to many civil cases .... ") (citation omitted).
100. See Nancy C. Dreher, One Judge's View of the Uniform Commercial Code in Bank-
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district court decisions carry persuasive weight, because the decisions
have no precedential effect, these courts serve only the most basic
functions of appellate review and fail to cultivate much needed predictability in the law. As a result, bankruptcy practitioners have sparse
guidance in advising their clients because many of even the most basic
issues in bankruptcy law have no authoritative resolution.
Reforming the current bankruptcy appeals process so that bankruptcy appeals are directly resolved at the circuit level, by a three judge
panel of Article III judges with the power to bind all of the courts below it, will advance the development of bankruptcy precedent and concomitantly satisfy the "law declaration" function now lacking in the
current system. 101 The American people deserve rules and legal constructs to guide private and commercial decisionmaking. Even the
bankruptcy court judiciary has been vocal on this issue recognizing that
"[t]he goal of predictability is not well-served when one lower court
judge must look to the decisions of two or ... as many as twenty different higher courts. " 102 Direct review of a bankruptcy decision by a
circuit court would create a body of law that is binding on the lower
courts, at least those within its jurisdiction, thereby creating much
needed legal certainty.
Another justification for direct review advanced by various legal
scholars is the belief that the circuit courts are better suited to decide
issues of law than the district courts because "trial courts are not wellsuited institutionally to have the final (or, more nearly, the 'final-as-apractical-matter') word on questions of law." 103 The proponents of direct review contend that the courts of appeals are better equipped than
the district courts to handle appeals because they are commonly asked
to reconcile the decisions of specialized agencies and courts resulting in
a coherent body of law. 104 Furthermore, because other cases have
statutory priority on the district court dockets, such as criminal prosecutions, petitions for writs of habeas corpus, civil discrimination suits
and the like, the district courts lack the opportunity to develop the level

ruptcy Court: Why it Doesn't Work the Way You Thought it Would, 19 MINN. L. REV. 777, 783
(1995) (stating that the "bankruptcy courts are the commercial courts in this country").
101. See Hershner, Jr., supra note 2, at 4 (stating that "direct appeals will add some certainty to the law that is not now present").
102. First of Am. Bank v. Gaylor, 123 B.R. 236, 242 (Bankr. E. D. Mich. 1991).
103. Busse!, supra note 11, at 1086 ("An appellate decision is generally endorsed by two or
more appellate judges. The issues on appeal are almost always few and legal in nature and the judicial energies are concentrated on those narrow, focused questions."). See also Evan H.
Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REv. 817
(1994) (noting the superiority of the courts of appeals to hear appeals).
104. See Caminker, supra note 103, at 847-48.
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of expertise that would make them effective as appellate courts. 105 Another benefit flowing from direct review is the benefit of the collaborative and deliberative effort offered by a multi-judge panel. 106 The advantages of direct appeal are lost when a bankruptcy case is first
appealed to a single district court judge. 107

C. Impediments to Change
The major negative effect articulated by commentators of eliminating the intermediate appellate tier in conjunction with the establishment
of direct appeals is the increased burden on the circuit courts of appeals. 108 Statistics reveal that circuit court bankruptcy caseloads would
increase from three percent of all appeals filed in the circuits to seven
percent. 109 Although a four percent increase in circuit court bankruptcy
appeals on its face may not appear to be a dramatic increase, in light of
the fact that bankruptcy filings are escalating at a rapid pace, 110 critics
argue that the circuit courts need to identify mechanisms that will reduce their caseloads, not increase them. 111
An increase in appellate court workload has obvious adverse implications. 112 Time is especially critical in bankruptcy matters where there
105. Barbara B. Crabb, In Defense of Direct Appeals: A Further Reply to Professor Chemerinsky, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 137, 145 (1997).
106. See Caminker, supra note 103, at 847.
107. See Commission Considers Venue, Jurisdiction, Appellate Changes at Februrary Meeting, AM. BANKR. INST. J., April 1996, available at 1996 ABI JNL. Lexis 662 (stating that the
"consensus among Commissioners [Bankruptcy Review Commissioners] was to favor providing
direct appeal to the circuit courts, eliminating district court review"). Federal Appeals Court Judge
Richard Arnold argues that there should be a change in the current system of two appeals as of
right because some district courts neglect their bankruptcy appeals and others rubber stamp the
bankruptcy court. /d.
108. See Christopher F. Carlton, The Grinding Wheel of Justice Needs Some Grease: Designing the Federal Courts of the Twenty-First Century, 6 KANS. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1997)
(discussing the crisis of volume now plaguing the federal courts); Harry T. Edwards, The Rising
Work Load and Perceived "Bureaucracy" of the Federal Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to
the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 IoWA L. REv. 871, 890 (1983) (discussing the increasing
number of cases filed in the federal court system); Martha J. Dragich, Once A Century: Time for a
Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 1996 W1S. L. REv. 11, 25 (stating that between 1960
and 1994 filings in the courts of appeals have "soared" 1139%).
109. Brittenham, Jr., supra note 71, at 257. For the one year period beginning July 1, 1994,
out of a total of 49,671 appeals that were filed in the circuit courts of appeals, 1675 (three percent
of all appeals) were bankruptcy appeals. /d. at 257 n.365. It is estimated that if direct review were
implemented, approximately 3,652 additional cases would be sent to the circuit courts of appeals.
110. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, supra note 3 (noting the quickly escalating number of bankruptcy filings).
111. See Charles W. Nihan & Harvey Rishikof, Rethinking the Federal Court System:
Thinking the Unthinkable, 14 M1SS. C. L. REv. 349, 365-66 (1994) (noting the need to reduce the
appellate court caseload); Brittenham, Jr., supra note 71, at 257-58 (same).
112. See Hershner, Jr., supra note 2, at 4 (stating that "whether the courts of appeal can
handle the extra workload, I don't know, and it will be up to Congress and the appeals courts to

56

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 14

is a dearth of assets and the existence of continuing appeals threatens
the debtor's prospects for rehabilitation. 113 The delay attendant to
lengthy appeals is harmful to all parties which explains why few cases
are litigated beyond the bankruptcy court and even fewer, one out of
every five, bankruptcy appeals to the district court ultimately reach a
court of appeals. 114 Thus, the pressure created by trying to stay abreast
of a congested docket threatens the successful performance of the law
declaration function of the federal courts of appeals. 115 Therefore, there
is a paradoxical likelihood that increased appellate activity may impair
the very quality of the process that justifies its use. 116
Another impediment to implementation of direct review is that the
proposal might intensify the current Article III constitutional concern
that the bankruptcy courts are wielding powers beyond those granted to
them under the Constitution. 117 In other words, some critics of the proposal would argue that giving de facto responsibility for both the factfinding and law-making functions to the bankruptcy judge would place
too much power in the hands of a non-Article III judge. 118 However,
proponents counter this theory by arguing that the elimination of the
first layer of bankruptcy appellate review would not affect the propriety
of a non-Article III bankruptcy court because the availability of review
by the Article III circuit court would provide the constitutionally mandated oversight. 119 As one legal scholar commented: "' [t]o the extent

assess it").
113. The median time for disposition in the district court for a bankruptcy appeal is slightly
less than five months while in the court of appeals the average is 10.9 months. Busse!, supra note
11, at 1092-93.
114. Fletcher Magnum, Memorandum to the Long Range Planning Committee of the Federal
Judicial Center 19 (Dec. 23, 1993).
115. Dorothy W. Nelson, Why Are Things Being Done This Way?: Reflections of a Former
Law School Dean on Becoming a Judge, 19 JUDGES' J. 13, 15 (1980). See Charles W. Wolfram,
Notes from a Study of the Caseload of the Minnesota Supreme Court: Some Comments and Statistics on Pressures and Responses, 53 MINN. L. REV. 939, 941 (1969) ("There seems to be rather
general agreement among lawyers who follow the work of the Court that the caseload battle has
recently reached a crisis stage."); Jack Leavitt, The Yearly Two Foot Shelf: Suggestions for
Changing Our Reviewing Court Procedures, 4 PAC. L.J. 1, 2 (1973) ("If we continue the present
system without appreciable changes, it will be hopelessly mired down it its own workload, or must
be expanded to such huge size that it will be unworkable.").
116. See Carolyn Dineen King, A Matter of Conscience, 28 Hous. L. REv. 955 (1991)
(stating that "to state the obvious, the quality of judges, their workload, their work practices, and
their attitudes have a material, sometimes even decisive impact on the quality of justice they dispense").
117. For a further discussion on the constitutionality of the bankruptcy courts, see supra
notes 25-34 and infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
118. Brittenham, Jr., supra note 71, at 256.
119. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article
Ill, 101 HARV. L. REv. 916 (1988) (arguing that the constitutional requirements are satisfied by
circuit court review).
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that the current bankruptcy system is constitutionally sound, the Proposal [direct review] is constitutionally sound. "' 120

D. Implementation of Direct Review
Implementation of direct review is not as difficult as it may appear
at first blush. 121 In fact, Congress implemented a similar proposal in the
1978 Act which provided that the initial appeal of a decision of the
bankruptcy court could go directly to the court of appeals if both parties
consented to bypassing the initial review by the district court. 122 Inexplicably, the optional direct review provision was eliminated in
BAFJA. 123
Direct review to the courts of appeals would require a change to the
current definition of appealability of bankruptcy orders. Presently, circuit courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals only from final decisions,
yet many of the orders issued in bankruptcy are interlocutory rulings. 124
A refinement to the current definition of appealability, however, is not
believed to be an insurmountable hurdle because "[t]inality is a creature
of statute and rule; statutes and rules can be amended. " 125 Congress
would also have to amend 28 U.S. C. § 158 that grants to the district
courts, as opposed to the courts of appeals, the power to hear bankruptcy court appeals.
It is time for Congress to take action. To be sure, on June 21,
1996, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission unanimously voted
to recommend to Congress the elimination of the first layer of bankruptcy appellate review. 126 Congress must recognize that the costs and
120. Brittenham, Jr., supra note 71, at 256-57 (quoting Memorandum from Professor Lawrence P. King & Elizabeth I. Holland to Professor Elizabeth Warren, Discussing the Issues Raised
by the proposal to Eliminate the First Layer of Review from the Bankruptcy Appellate Process
(July 15, 1996)).
121. A procedure utilizing direct appeals is currently used by the United States Tax Court.
See 26 U.S.C. § 7482 (1988).
122. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 236(a). For the language of
the relevant provision in the 1978 Act, see supra note 90. See also Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Barakat, 173 B.R. 675, 676 n.1 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994) (noting that prior to BAFJA, the 1978 Act
"included a third option of direct appeal to the circuit court of appeals, if the parties consented").
123. See Reforming the Bankruptcy Code: The National Bankruptcy Conference's Code Review Project, Final Report 53 (1994) ("It is unclear whether there was a reason for the repeal or
whether its elimination was due to oversight."); Frank Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Court and Its
Jurisdiction, 1995-96 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 485, 506 (stating that the optional path for direct
review was withdrawn in 1984 without explanation).
124. The circuit courts of appeals have jurisdiction over appeals from final decisions, orders,
judgments and decrees under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) and (d). See 1 LAWRENCE P. KING ET AL.,
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY p. 5.07 (15th ed. rev. 1996) (discussing the "final order" requirement).
125. Crabb, supra note 105, at 146 (footnote omitted).
126. See Nathan V. Feinstein & Timothy P. Branigan, Review Commission Recommends
Eliminating District Court-Level Appeals in Favor of District Appeals From Bankruptcy Judges to
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delay necessarily involved in the current two-stage review process
grossly disserves litigants and the judicial system as a whole. Forcing
litigants to undergo a preliminary review at the district court level
merely adds to the costs of appeal and increases the period of uncertainty while providing only a nominal benefit to future litigants and the
public. By issuing opinions that are binding on the lower courts, the
courts of appeals would bring a measure of certainty and predictability
to the bankruptcy law and would reduce the number of issues that are
needlessly being litigated by courts within the same jurisdiction. Although the increased workload to the courts of appeals is the regrettable
price of implementing direct review, it is greatly outweighed by the
numerous advantages of eliminating the middle layer of appeal.
V. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANELS IN
EVERY CIRCUIT

Another proposal strongly advocated by numerous legal reformers
since the 1978 Act is the use of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel or
"BAP. " 127 A BAP consists of a panel of three Article I bankruptcy
judges who hear all first-level appeals from every bankruptcy court in
the circuit. 128 Thus, under the current system, a BAP would take the
place of the district court.

A. History of Bankruptcy Appellate Panels
Under the 1978 Act, appeals of orders entered by bankruptcy
judges could be heard by a district judge, 129 BAP, 130 or the courts of ap-

the 12 Regional Circuit Courts, NAT'L L.J. B 5·6 (Sept. 16, 1996).
127. See Michael A. Berch, The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and its Implications for Adoption of Specialist Panels in the Court of Appeals, RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE 165 (Arthur D. Hellmaned., 1990).
128. The number of bankruptcy judges serving in the BAP will be determined by local rules
and will vary by circuit. The Bankruptcy Code only requires that three judges from each district,
other than the one from which the appeal originated, sit on each reviewing panel. See 28 U.S. C. §
158(0)(5) (1999).
129. Section 1334(a) of28 U.S.C. stated: "The district courts for districts which panels have
not been ordered appointed under section 160 of this title shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all
final judgments, orders, and decrees of bankruptcy courts." 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1978) (repealed
1984).
130. Section 160(a) of 28 U.S.C. stated:
If the circuit council of a circuit orders application of this section to a district within
such circuit, the chief judge of each circuit shall designate panels of three bankruptcy
judges to hear appeals from judgment~. orders, and decrees of the bankruptcy court of
the United States for such district. Except as provided in section 293(c) of this title, a
panel shall be composed only of bankruptcy judges for districts located in the circuit in
which the appeal arises. The chief judge shall designate a sufficient number of such
panels so that appeals may be heard and disposed of expeditiously.
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peals if all the parties to the appeal consented. 131 With the passage of
BAFJA, although the circuits continued to have the power to establish
BAPs, there were numerous revisions regarding their implementation.
One major change was that the parties were required to consent to
having a BAP hear and determine an appeal. 132 Another major change
was that the district court must by majority vote authorize an appeal to
be heard and determined by a BAP. 133
In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee (the "Committee")
proposed to change the law to require mandatory use of BAPs thereby
eliminating the consent requirement. 134 The Committee advocated the
use of BAPs claiming that they "foster expertise, and increase the morale, of bankruptcy judges, in part by offering them an opportunity for
appellate work. " 135 Several influential members of Congress took heed
of the Committee's recommendations 136 and finally, as part of the 1994
Act, Congress made BAPs the presumptively preferred method for reviewing appeals from orders of bankruptcy judges. 137 The 1994 Act required the judicial council 138 within each circuit to establish a BAP that

!d. (repealed 1984).
131. Section 1293(b) of 28 U.S.C. stated:
Notwithstanding section 1482 of this title, a court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of
an appeal from a final judgment, order, or decree of an appellate panel created under
section 160 or a District court of the United States or from a final judgment, order, or
decree of a bankruptcy court of the United States if the parties to such appeal agree to a
direct appeal to the court of appeals.
!d. § 1293(b) (repealed 1984).
132. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l) (1987). The statute does not specify whether the consent
must be expressed or implied. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8001(e), which became effective in August 1987, states that each circuit may determine what constitutes consent. FED. R.
BANKR. P. 8001(e) and the accompanying 1987 Advisory Committee Note.
133. 28 U.S.C. § 158(B)(2) (1994).
134. See Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee 74-76 (1990) at 74-75.
135. !d.
136. United States Senator Howell Heflin (the former Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme
Court) announced his support of the use of BAPs on the Senate floor stating that "the intent of
section 104(c) [implementing broad use of BAPs] is to require the judicial council of each circuit
to establish a bankruptcy appellate panel service." 140 CONG. REC. S14463 (daily ed. Oct. 6,
1994).
137. Those amendments provide, in relevant part:
The judicial council of a circuit shall establish a bankruptcy appellate panel service
composed of bankruptcy judges of the districts in the circuit who are appointed by the
judicial Council in accordance with paragraph (3), to hear and determine, with the consent of all the parties, appeals under subsection (a) ....
28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1994).
138. Congress created an administrative judicial council in each regional circuit, composed
of an equal number of court of appeals and district judges and presided over by the chief judge of
the court of appeals. The judicial council is charged with "mak[ing] all necessary orders for the
effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts in its circuit." 28 U.S.C. §
332 (1982).
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would decide bankruptcy appeals in all cases where a party has not
opted-out. 139 The requirement that each circuit implement a BAP came
with two significant exceptions. The judicial council for each circuit
must evaluate (1) whether the circuit has sufficient judicial resources
for the establishment of BAPs, and (2) whether implementation would
cause "undue delay" upon bankruptcy litigation or heightened cost for
the parties involved. 140 If either of these circumstances is present, the
judicial council may refuse to implement a BAP. 141 Furthermore, individual districts may opt-out of the use of the BAPs by a majority vote
of the district court judges of the district. 142 Currently, BAPs have only
been implemented in six circuits. 143

B. Advantages of BAPs
The primary advantages of implementing BAPs most often cited by
legal scholars, judges and attorneys are the quality of the decisions produced and the consequential reduction of the workload in the district
courts and the courts of appeals.

I. Quality of decisions
The advantage most often noted of implementing BAPs is that the
quality of the decisions produced by the panels would be of higher
quality than decisions rendered by district court judges. 144 The rationale

139. !d.
140. !d. § 158(b)(1)(A)-(B) (1994). Senator Heflin noted the purpose of the opt-out provisions:
We also recognize that there will be some circumstances in individual circuits where the
establishment of a bankruptcy appellate panel service would not be a benefit to the parties or to the system. Therefore, we have included language that permits a judicial
council to determine that there are insufficient judicial resources available in the circuit
to create a bankruptcy appellate panel service or that creation of such a service will result in undue delay or increased cost to the parties .... There may be situations where
the number of bankruptcy appeals filed do not warrant the creation of this new system.
In some districts, the medium disposition time for disposing of bankruptcy appeals i5
efficient under the current system. It should be recognized that the creation of a bankruptcy appellate panel service can help to establish a dependable body of bankruptcy
case law.
140 CONG. REc. S14463 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1994).
141. !d. § 158(b)(l).
142. 28 U.S.C. § 104(C)(4) (1994).
143. See Crabb, supra note 105, at 139 n.12. Only the First, Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth
and Tenth Circuits have implemented bankruptcy appellate panels. !d.
144. See Chemerinsky, supra note 74, at 130 ("In this context, the Article I BAP seems superior in determining questions of bankruptcy law to the nonexpert federal district court."); Lisa
Hill Fenning, a bankruptcy judge in California, advocates BAPs stating that "the development of
[bankruptcy] law in this circuit has been largely advanced by the BAPs." How the Ninth Circuit
Made BAPs Work, Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP), Dec. 6, 1994, Vol. 26, Issue 6, Al, at All. Judge
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underlying this theory is that bankruptcy judges are more uniquely
qualified to deal with the highly technical and specialized field of bankruptcy law than district court judges. 145 Therefore, "[a]ttorneys working
in the field of bankruptcy believe that BAPs are more likely to correctly
decide a complex case than a district court, partly because BAPs give
closer study to the appeals. " 146 As a commentator recently noted:
"[B]ankruptcy judges are better equipped to decide bankruptcy matters
than are district judges. Bankruptcy law is highly specialized and intricate. Most district court judges are relatively unfamiliar with bankruptcy law and have no time to learn it." 147
The statistics clearly indicate that generally bankruptcy judges are
better able to correctly apply the Bankruptcy Code than district court
judges. For instance, in a recent year, courts of appeals affirmed BAP
decisions at a rate of fifty-one percent, compared to only thirty-five
percent for district court decisions. 148 Moreover, reversals were at a
rate of five percent for BAPs and eleven percent for district courts. 149
Thus, as a result of the "expert" appellate review provided by BAPs,
the law would become more settled and the parties would be more confident in the decisions rendered. 150
2. Reduction of workloads in the district courts and the courts of
appeals
Those circuits choosing to implement BAPs would realize a much-

Penning continued: "District judges are reluctant to publish opinions of bankruptcy matters because they are overworked and don't necessarily have time to write them and because they are not
confident of their analysis of bankruptcy issues." /d.
145. Brittenham, Jr., supra note 71, at 244-45. See Thomas E. Carlson, The Case for Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, 1990 BYU L. REv. 545, 559 (noting the highly complex nature of bankruptcy law); Judicial Conference of the U.S., Report To The Federal Courts Study Committee Of
The Subcommittee On The Role Of The Federal Courts And Their Relation To The States 358, 362
(1990) (noting that "even the most diligent district court judges cannot acquire the same expertise
in bankruptcy matters" as BAP judges).
146. Brittenham, Jr., supra note 71, at 244-45 (footnote omitted). See Chemerinsky, supra
note 74, at 128 (" [T]he BAP is desirable because it allows specialist bankruptcy judges to replace
nonspecialist federal district court judges.").
147. Brookner, supra note 73, at 327-28 (footnotes omitted). Critics that oppose BAPs usually favor a generalist court because in their view it is preferable to have a judge with a "broad
general understanding of the law rather than a myopic view that might have come from a specialized, elitist group of practitioners and judges who come from that group of practitioners." See
Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., Address at the Meeting of the Third Circuit Judicial Conference on
BAPs (Apr. 2-4, 1995).
148. Fed. Jud. Center, Plan. & Tech. Div. Progress Rep., Dec. 23, 1993, at 14-15.
149. /d.
150. See Broome, supra note 85, at 548 (stating that the use of a BAP panel is "attractive in
cases where the parties believe that the expertise of a panel of judges knowledgeable in the specific
operation of the Bankruptcy Code would be preferable to an appeal to a generalist judge.").
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needed reduction of the workloads in the district courts as well as the
circuit courts of appeals. In the Ninth Circuit, where BAPs have been
utilized by all districts since 1982, the number of appeals filed in the
court of appeals and the percentage of decisions on the merits have
been significantly reduced. 151 It is estimated that BAPs in the Ninth Circuit have reduced the appellate court's workload by 135 filings. 152 This
net savings, a remarkable fifteen percent, is a result of only approximately ten percent of the decisions of BAPs being appealed as compared to the district court rate of twenty-five percent. 153
The primary rationale for the reason why BAP decisions are appealed less often than district court decisions is that there is an increased level of attorney confidence in BAP decisions as opposed to
district court decisions. 154 In a survey of bankruptcy practitioners undertaken to investigate practitioners' views of BAPs, respondents indicated by the overwhelming margin of two-to-one that they considered
BAP opinions to be "better products" than district court opinions. 155
Based on this statistical differential, BAP proponents have extrapolated
the numbers and have concluded that by implementing a BAP, the circuit court docket would be reduced by the equivalent of the workload of
more than one circuit judge. 156
Likewise, the workload in the district courts would also be reduced
by the use of BAPs. The district courts would have a reduced number
of cases because each case that is heard by a BAP is one less case that
the district court must decide. Even though only a small number of
bankruptcy cases are appealed to the district courts each year, a substantial amount of the judges' time is devoted to resolving their bankruptcy caseload. 157 Thus, the implementation of BAPs would most cer151. See Gordon Bermant & Judy B. Sloan, Bankruptcy Appellate Panels: The Ninth Circuit's Experience, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 181, 192-93, 205, 210 (1989) (providing an excellent discussion of the effect of implementation of BAPs in the Ninth Circuit).
152. /d. at 210.
153. /d. at 209.
154. See Mark A. Cohen, Report Issued on Bankruptcy Panels, MASS. LAW. WKLY. 40
(Apr. I, 1996) (stating that attorneys are more comfortable with BAP decisions because BAPs use
"collective wisdom").
155. Bermant & Sloan, supra note 151, at 215.
156. Wiseman, Jr., supra note 66, at 7.
157. See Carlson, supra note 145, at 561 n. 73 (noting reduction in district court caseload);
see also Busse!, supra note 11, at 1093 n. 109 ("Preliminary figures also suggest that 10% of all
district court bankruptcy appeals take over 608 days, and 5% over 822 days.") (citing Memorandum from Edward Flynn, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, to Francis F. Szcebak, Chief Bankruptcy Division, Administrative Office of United States Courts (July 7, 1993));
ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. CTS., APPENDIX I, 1993 U.S.
Cts. Selected Reps tbl. C-2 at A1-54 to A1-55, and tbl. D at A1-105 (citing statistics of bankruptcy appeals commenced in U.S. district courts); Fed. Jud. Center, Plan. & Tech. Division Progress Rep., December 23, 1993, at 15 (demonstrating that each district court judge adjudicates, on
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tainly be a step in the right direction toward ameliorating the "crises of
volume" that now plagues our federal courts. 158

C. Disadvantages of BAPs
While the advantages to creating BAPs are abundant, there are
some disadvantages that are readily apparent such as the administrative
costs, the increased workload on bankruptcy judges, the questionable
constitutionality of BAPs and the uncertain precedential value to be accorded to BAP decisions.
1. Administrative costs

The primary disadvantage in creating BAPs is the additional resources that would be required for the new court. Creating a BAP requires additional personnel, automation support, procurement, space,
equipment, maintenance and supplies. The costs to create and sustain a
BAP are substantial. To support BAPs, the Ninth Circuit incurs expenses of approximately $1.5 million annually. 159 Salaries alone for the
judges and secretaries of the Ninth Circuit BAPs amount to approximately $330,000 per year excluding fringe benefits. 160 Additionally, the
clerks' and staff attorneys' salaries amount to $418,579 per year. 161
These increased costs, however, would be more than offset by the
diminution in the volume of the district court and circuit court dockets
and the value provided by the enhanced quality of the decisions rendered by the BAPs.
2. Increased workload on bankruptcy judges

A non-monetary disadvantage of implementing BAPs is the increased workload on the bankruptcy judges. Those bankruptcy judges
that sit on BAPs must either shift their work to other bankruptcy judges
to take up the slack or work longer hours. 162 Indeed, the central reason
for including the statutory exception allowing the circuits to refuse to
implement BAPs if there were insufficient judicial resources was because Congress was not sure whether bankruptcy judges would be
average, approximately two bankruptcy cases each year). But see Wiseman, Jr., supra note 66, at
6 ("Such a reduction [in district judges' workload) would occur, but it would not be significant.").
158. Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee, 1990 at 109-10.
159. Wiseman, Jr., supra note 66, at 4. See Crabb, supra note 105, at 141 n.23. (noting the
"inevitability of increased costs that accompany" the implementation BAPs).
160. Wiseman, Jr., supra note 66, at 4.
161. /d.
162. See Morris, supra note 44, at 1512 ("In effect, the bankruptcy judges must be willing
to voluntarily accept additional work.") (footnote omitted).
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willing to accept the increased workload. 163
As noted by the Federal Courts Study Commission, however, although BAPs increase the bankruptcy judges' workload, 164 BAP judges
view the work as an honor and a unique opportunity to "improve[] judicial service to the litigants who desire it. " 165 In fact, many bankruptcy
judges sitting on BAPs state that they feel as though it is their judicial
duty to shoulder the additional burdens imposed by BAPs in light of the
substantial benefits that BAPs provide. 166

3. Constitutional concerns
Critics of BAPs argue that they violate the Constitution because
non-Article III bankruptcy judges constituting the BAPs would be reviewing the decisions of other non-Article III bankruptcy court
judges. 167 Thus, the critics contend, the constitutional protections provided by Article III would be non-existent. 168
There are at least two counter-arguments that have been made as to
why BAPs do not violate the Constitution. The first counter-argument
is that BAPs are not outside their power as non-Article III judges because the circuit courts of appeals can exercise their Article III powers
by reviewing the BAP decisions and substituting their own judgment if
necessary. 169 Thus, the requirement of Article III review is preserved.
163. Chief Bankruptcy Judge Thomas E. Carlson, BAPs and Chapter 11 Status Conferences
Under H.R. 5116, BANKR. CT. DEC. (LRP), Dec. 6, 1994, at A3-4. What exactly constitutes "insufficient judicial resources" is uncertain. Some argue that costs such as additional law clerks,
BAP court clerks, deputy clerks and facilities must be included. Morris, supra note 44, at 1512.
Others, however, argue that "judicial resources" only includes "human" resources. 1d.
164. The Federal Courts Study Commission suggested appointing bankruptcy judges to sit on
the BAP full time because it "would enhance the prestige of the job and create a career path that
could reward good service at the trial level." Federal Courts Study Commission, Working Papers
and Subcommittee Reports Vol. I, at 364 (1990).
165. Federal Courts Study Commission, Working Papers and Subcommittee Reports Vol. 1,
at 364 (1990).
166. Bermant & Sloan, supra note 151, at 218. Many judges take the position that the BAP
judges should choose to work more hours with no additional compensation while not reducing their
workload. As Judge Lloyd George of the District of Nevada stated: "There's no question that it
requires more work on the part of the bankruptcy judges, and if the bankruptcy judges are unwilling to recognize that it's going to take more time and it's going to require dedicated service, then
it's foolish to start the process at all." Honorable Lloyd D. George, Address at the Meeting of the
Third Circuit Judicial Conference on BAPs (Apr. 2-4, 1995).
167. For an in-depth discussion of the constitutionality of BAPs, see Brittenham Jr., supra
note 71, at 238-43.
168. 1d. See Morris, supra note 44, at 1523 (discussing the constitutional concerns of BAPs
with regard to having non-Article lli bankruptcy judges hearing appeals of the bankruptcy court
decisions).
169. Carlson, supra note 145, at 566-67. See Busse!, supra note II, at 1095 (advocating the
constitutionality of BAPs because "the BAP would be subject to supervision and control by higher
Article lli courts").
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The second counter-argument is that because the 1978 Act included a
BAP provision and the Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline did not
hold the provision unconstitutional, the use of BAPs must logically be
constitutional. 170 In any event, several circuits have implemented BAPs
and they continue to survive constitutional scrutiny. 171
4. Precedential value of BAP decisions
Although one of the primary advantages advocated by BAP advocates is the notion that BAPs provide a dependable body of bankruptcy
case law because of the quality of the opinions, 172 this concept must be
tempered with the fact that neither Congress, the Supreme Court or the
circuit courts have explicitly addressed the issue of the precedential effect to be accorded to BAP decisions by the bankruptcy courts. 173
There is a wide range of decisions with regard to the precedential
effect of BAP decisions on bankruptcy courts. Some courts have decided that BAP decisions are not binding on the bankruptcy courts, 174
while other courts have announced that BAP decisions will have stare
decisis effect. 175 Furthermore, it is not even clear whether BAP opinions bind other BAPs. 176 The uncertainty regarding the issue of stare
170. See Morris, supra note 44, at 1522-1523.
171. See Brittenham, Jr., supra note 71, at 231 (listing the circuits that have implemented
BAPs). As Judge Conrad Cyr of the First Circuit stated: "I don't see the BAP provision as exacerbating any Constitutional problems. In that respect, I see this as pretty much a neutral development." Judge Conrad Cyr, On BAPs and the Constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Courts, BANKR,
CT. DEC. (LRP), Dec. 6, 1994, at A6.
172. Carlson, supra note 145, at 559.
173. Although the United States Constitution permits Congress to establish "uniform Laws
on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States," the current bankruptcy appellate
structure fails to produce these results. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
174. See In re Standard Brands Paint Co., 154 B.R. 563, 568 n.3 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993)
(stating that BAP decisions do not bind bankruptcy judges); Oregon v. Selden, 121 B.R. 59, 62
(Bankr. D. Or. 1990) (holding that BAP decisions from one district are not binding on bankruptcy
courts of another district); Case Corp. v. Milner, 180 B.R. 245, 254 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995)
(same); Homestate Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. Brosman, 119 B.R. 212, 213-14 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1990)
(same); see also Kathleen P. March & Rigoberto V. Obregon, Are BAP Decisions Binding on any
Court?, 18 CAL. BANKR. J. 189, 197-99 (1990) (arguing that BAP decisions are only persuasive
authority and do not bind any court). Those that argue that the BAPs should not be given precedential value argue that because a single federal district court judge is not bound to follow the decisions of other district court judges, and a BAP exercises appellate authority similar to that of a
district court judge reviewing bankruptcy court decisions, a BAP panel cannot bind other BAP
panels or district courts. Jd. at 197-99. Likewise, because bankruptcy courts are adjuncts to district
courts, the bankruptcy courts are not bound by the BAP panel's decisions. /d.
175. See Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Proudfoot, 144 B.R. 876, 878-79 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1992); Muskin, Inc. v. Indus. Steel Co., 151 B.R. 252, 253-55 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1993); In re
General Associated Investors Ltd. Partnership, 150 B.R. 756, 760-61 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1993); In
re Torrez, 132 B.R. 924, 943 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1991); Coq v. Hackenkamp, 110 B.R. 1, 3
(Bankr. C. D. Cal. 1989); In re Thunderbird Inn, Inc., 151 B.R. 224, 227 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1993).
176. Broome, supra note 85, at 542. In 1995, however, a BAP panel stated that BAPs in the
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decisis is alarming because if BAP decisions are not binding on all the
bankruptcy courts in the circuit, then BAPs will fail to serve their intended purpose of developing a uniform body of bankruptcy law. 177
Moreover, under the current statutory scheme, since BAPs sit in place
of the district court, there will inevitably be a conflict between a district
court decision and a BAP decision. 178
Because the district courts and the BAPs provide the same appellate
function over bankruptcy cases, the varying viewpoints of the bankruptcy appellate court regime creates an uncertainty concerning the
proper role of precedent within the bankruptcy court system. 179 In order
to accomplish one of the central purposes of BAPs, to create a uniform
and consistent body of bankruptcy law, 18° Congress or the circuit courts
must step forward and pronounce that the inherent benefits of the doctrine of stare decisis mandate that the decisions of BAPs be given
binding effect by the bankruptcy and district courts. 181 One solution is
Ninth Circuit will not overrule prior rulings of other BAP panels unless a Ninth Circuit decision,
Supreme Court decision, or subsequent legislation has undermined those prior rulings. See Ball v.
Payco-General Am. Credits, Inc., 185 B.R. 5895 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Life Ins. Co. of Va. v.
Barakat, 173 B.R. 672, 677-79 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994) ("For a multipanel system to work, it is
necessary that all panels within a circuit be bound by the decisions of all other panels within the
circuit .... One panel on a circuit cannot reverse the decision of another panel of the circuit,
even if inclined to do so.").
177. See Coyne, 149 B.R. at 618 ("A uniform view of precedent in the bankruptcy system is
necessary for efficient adjudication and development of bankruptcy law."); Busse!, supra note 11,
at 1098 ("Stare decisis is a logical imperative of the BAP and district court law-declaring role.").
178. While BAPs and district courts serve the same appellate function, several factors lead to
the conclusion that BAP decisions should be given strict adherence while the district court decisions given persuasive authority. First, BAPs are composed of bankruptcy judges with expertise in
the complex field of bankruptcy law. Second, because BAP judges serve as bankruptcy trial judges
in addition to their duties as appellate judges, they remain current with new developments in the
bankruptcy law. Carlson, supra note 145, at 558-59. Finally, BAP judges sit on three-judge panels
and benefit from the collegiality of the panel. /d. Conversely, the district court judges review relatively few bankruptcy appeals per year and are unaccustomed to the appellate role. Caminker, supra note 103, at 847.
179. Compare Chermerinsky, supra note 74, at 128 ("I think that BAP decisions clearly
should be binding on bankruptcy courts."), and David A. Levin, Precedent and the Assertion of
Bankruptcy Court Autonomy: Efficient or Arrogant?, 12 BANK. DEY. J. 185, 202 (1995) ("BAP
decisions can and should have binding precedential authority over all bankruptcy courts within the
circuit .... ) (footnote omitted), with March & Obregon, supra note 174, at 197-99 ("[a]n
emerging view, and possibly the better reasoned view, is that BAP case law is not binding on any
court.").
180. See 140 CONG. REc. S14,463 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1994) (statement of Senator Heflin)
("It should be recognized that the creation of a bankruptcy appellate panel service can help to establish a dependable body of bankruptcy case law.").
181. Professor Chemerinsky noted the value of stare decisis:
If appellate precedents are followed, there is no need to litigate the same issue repeatedly in different cases. The question is decided in an appellate court, and lower courts
are then responsible for following that decision. Second, binding appellate precedents
foster consistency. If each bankruptcy judge is free to decide an issue for himself or
herself, varying results are inevitable. The outcome of the legal questions is likely to
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to make the BAPs "adjuncts" of the United States Court of Appeals
which have the power to bind the bankruptcy courts within the geographic area of the circuit. 182 Another solution is to grant Article III
status to bankruptcy judges which would mean that BAPs would necessarily become Article III tribunals since BAPs are composed of bankruptcy judges. 183

D. Implementation of BAPs
The creation of a BAP is a "sound and creative approach to appellate uniformity." 184 Each of the judicial circuits that have not already
implemented BAPs should allocate the appropriate resources in order to
ensure their implementation thus guaranteeing that the bankruptcy system does not falter as the increased burden on the system continues to
mount. Although the implementation of BAPs comes at great cost, it is
a small price to pay relative to the apparent and convincing benefits that
BAPs provide.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have come to a critical crossroad in the history of the bankruptcy court. The current bankruptcy court structure is inconsistent
with its intended function. The system should be reformed to allow the
experts, the bankruptcy judges, to effectively make bankruptcy law that
is accorded precedential value "within the confines of the Constitution
and the common law. " 185 The time is ripe for a fresh initiative and we
must not wait until the crisis intensifies to such a level that our jurisprudential legacy is irrevocably destroyed.
The achievement of the objectives sought in this Article calls for,
inter alia, effective leadership, the involvement of all three branches of
the federal government, the active participation of lawyers and bar associations and even the general public. Any course of action to deal

depend on the identity of the judge. Binding appellate precedents thus foster fairness
and equity among litigants. Third, binding appellate precedents foster predictability in
the law. Individuals can know the law and base their conduct accordingly. Lawyers can
know the law and advise their clients accordingly. Without binding precedent, the law
is uncertain and the benefits of predictability are lost.
Chemerinsky, supra note 74, at 128.
182. See Coyne v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 149 B.R. 614, 620 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993)
(advancing the argument that the jurisdictional statutes and Ninth Circuit rules make the BAP an
adjunct of the United States Court of Appeals).
183. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1994).
184. Roger M. Whelan, 'Yes Virginia, There is a Santa Claus' (And a New Bankruptcy Bill):
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 401, 404 (1994).
185. See Brookner, supra note 73, at 330 (1993).
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with reforming the bankruptcy courts must have two objectives: first,
the development of a system which can accommodate the rapidly increasing flood of bankruptcy filings while still remaining consistent
with historical jurisprudential values; second, the enactment of the proposals by Congress. 186 One caveat for Congress; however, is that court
reform is an area which dictates thoughtful reflection and planning because once structural changes in an institution take place, it is difficult
to turn back.
As we enter into the twenty-first century we should remember that
the appropriate role of the judiciary in American society is to dispense
justice, for it is that role more than the condition of the courts that presents the greatest possibility for decisive change in response to the crisis.187 The bankruptcy courts are a major component of our commercial
culture and must respond to changes in demographics, politics and the
economy of this dynamic nation. 188
Congress must recognize that the demands on the bankruptcy courts
are so numerous and complex that several proposals must be adopted
that are consistent with enduring principles of justice. All of the proposals in this Article are fraught with uncertainty and risk, but individuals both in the public and private sectors must band together as a
catalytic force. Failing to put the bankruptcy courts in a position to perform their mission effectively would be a serious failure of public responsibility with catastrophic consequences. We must implement these
plans so that "[w]e may look forward to a near future when our courts
will be swift and certain agents of justice, whose decisions will be acquiesced in and respected by all. " 189 This can be achieved only by designing and implementing a long-range plan that will meet the needs of
our bankruptcy system as we boldly enter the twenty-first century.

186. See Baker, supra note 77, at 912 ("The plea for Congress to "'do more and do better"'
seems to have some as yet unrealized potential.").
187. See Warren E. Burger, American Law Institute Study on Paths to a "Better Way": Litigation, Alternatives, and Accommodation: Foreword, 1989 DUKE L.J. 808 (1989) ("The machinery of
justice is in the hands of the profession; lawyers and judges have a duty to make the system work better
and the public has a right to look to us for some answers.").
188. See Gerling, supra note 4, at 519 ("The bankruptcy court has become the repository of
so many disputes between so many competing interests that affect the very fabric of the nation's
economic life.").
189. Roscoe Pound, The Cnuses of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 291 (1964).

